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1 Executive Summary 
The online identity of the end-user is one of the key enabler of every modern digital service. To get 
the access to the cloud, to perform e-commerce transactions, to chat online and to perform many 
other operations, the user needs to provide proof of his digital identity (e-id). In doing that he 
expose himself to the risk of disclosing sensitive information on his life and his online activities.  
The scientific contribution of this report is twofold: on a side it provides a first, explorative overview 
of the state of the art in the world of soft-identity management systems, and on the other he 
presents the first outcomes of a research activity aiming at proposing a solution to address trust and 
privacy protection issues related to identity and personal data provided by citizens in a smart 
environment. The proposed solution combines identity management, trust negotiation, and usage 
control. The concept of identity management allows creation of less privacy sensitive soft identities 
derived from hard identities with high assurance. Trust negotiation techniques are used during the 
authentication phase to support the identity establishment process between the entities in the 
smart city. After the identity is established we use usage control policies to govern the exchange of 
identity and personal data in a privacy friendly manner.  
This report constitutes the first of a series of reports which aim at defining methods and techniques 
to empower the citizen in the protection of his online privacy. 
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2 Introduction 
The role of identity is extremely important in our society. On the basis of our identities we are 
allowed or denied to perform every day vital operations.  
From a philosophical point of view, the identity is the key of every human interaction. We adapt the 
interaction with a person on the basis of an evaluation of his identity and the surrounding context.  
We accept to execute tasks on the basis of the identity of the person requiring that task; we trust on 
information obtained on the basis of the identity of the information source. 
Traditionally the evaluation of the identity of a person involves information related to:  
1. What we know about this person    
2. What we see and feel about this person 
3. What others say about this person (being the “others” provided with some level of trust) 
Within the whole “game” of evaluating an identity, establishing a level of trust and acting in 
consequence, a strong role is played by the possibility of physically verifying who the counterpart 
with whom we are interacting is. 
In the digital world, on the other hand, human interactions are indeed extremely limited and the 
identity evaluation relies obviously less on point (2) and a more on point (1) and (3).   
According to the standard ISO/IEC 24760 (part 1), a digital identity is defined as “a set of attributes 
related to an entity”, where entity refers to an individual, an organization, or a device. Attributes are 
properties of the entity (e.g. address, phone number etc.).  
Digital identities can be categorized according to the security level adopted in the registration and 
authentication phases, i.e. when a digital identity is associated to a target entity. So we can have 
Hard and Soft electronic identity (e-id).  
In our digital society, the concept of digital identity is becoming more and more relevant and in fact, 
the section 2.1.2 of the “Digital Agenda for Europe” makes an explicit reference to digital identities: 
“Electronic identity (eID) technologies and authentication services are essential for transactions on 
the Internet both in the private and public sectors. […] As there will be many solutions, industry, 
supported by policy actions – in particular eGovernment services - should ensure interoperability 
based on standards and open development platforms”. 
The problem is that, outside the realm of the so called Strong-eID (e.g. electronic ID cards), the 
average citizen does not pay enough attention to its his digital identity, and, in several cases, he is 
not even aware of possessing one, or, more commonly, multiple identities.  
An e-mail account is a digital identity, the account I use to write on a forum is a digital identity as 
well as Facebook, Dropbox, Twitter, and PayPal accounts are.  
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The fact is that a single format for our online identities does not exist, as a set of unified procedures 
regulating their protection and management is not defined. As specified in ISO/IEC 24760, 
everything which can be used to identify myself online in a unique manner is, per se, a digital 
identity.  
In this report we are focusing on soft identities security issues as this kind of identities are the ones 
mostly used by the citizens in their daily activities. Accessing social networks, email accounts and 
even watching programs from a smart television requires a soft identity. Moreover, due to their 
frequent use the user may not realize the importance or the implications of misusing or losing one. 
In most cases it happens that such identities are interlinked either in an immediate or intermediate 
way. For example, a Facebook identity is linked with one user email identity which is linked with a 
second email identity as a backup solution and so on. In the end it turns out that a chain of identities 
from the same physical person exists, and if one of the bonds is vulnerable, all the other bonds may 
become vulnerable as well. This is in fact not rare as one can see from incidents like this: 
[http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/all/] 
2.1 Digital Identity in the IoT and Smart World 
The digital identity definition has been extended recently with a sort of “inheritance principle”. 
Citizens are starting to make massively use of smart-devices and smart-sensors which are connected 
to the Internet. 
To get access to online services they need to configure their devices using their own credentials, 
giving to these devices rights to operate in their name.  
Let take as example a smart-TV: the citizen, to download and see content should provide to the 
smart-TV a mean to authenticate itself to the online services. Typically, the authentication will imply 
the use of some sort of digital-identity linked to the owner of the TV-subscription; in other words, 
the smart-TV inherits a “portion” of the identity of its owner. The same situation happens when for 
example the citizen configures his mobile-phone to get synchronized with the company’s calendar. 
To get direct access to this commodity, the smart-phone will need to authenticate itself to the 
calendar service using some personal credentials; again, the smart-device inherits part of the 
identity of its owner. 
The same principle can be applied considering the more extended scenario of a Smart City, where 
digital identities or aggregates of digital identities are associated to complex systems used to deliver 
secure and trusted physical services to the citizen, e.g. public transportation, car to car 
communication, remotely monitored Health care devices etc. 
However, digital identities do not impact only on the daily life of the citizen, as their role is becoming 
more and more important also in the industrial sector.  
Lets consider the world of Industrial Control Systems (ICS); the increasing use of general purpose 
telecommunication networks (i.e. Internet) in these infrastructures, acted as a sort of glue, so that, 
today, we can say that ICS (and SCADA systems) are remotely controlled and accessed. Also in this 
case digital identities have a relevant role. To access to certain remote components or control 
servers, identities with associated roles and rights need to be used. Their management, the way in 
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which they are protected and revoked – if needed, should and must be one of the top priorities for 
the security of a critical infra-structure.  
The same consideration can be done also when thinking about the communication of low level 
control devices (e.g. PLCs). In this case, especially for those installations spread in geographically 
remote locations, with scarce or in-existing surveillance (let consider for example a gas or oil pipeline 
passing through remote regions of the world), the problem of securely manage their digital identities 
(in this case crypto-material allowing to sign and authenticate their readings and control messages) 
should be of high relevance. 
An interesting playground where citizen identities and industrial infrastructures are quickly 
converging is that of smart-metering. Smart-meters can be considered the ultimate leafs of the 
smart-grids. These objects are at the moment those in charge for measuring the energy 
consumptions of the citizen, and, in some countries, for measuring also the energy production of the 
citizen. 
However, to really benefit from the establishment of a smart-energy grid, soon these meters will 
need to get more and more integrated, on a side, with the energy-distribution infrastructure, and on 
the other, with the citizen’s home digital infrastructure. Here again the digital identity inheritance 
principle described before will play a relevant role in the protection of the privacy of the citizen 
while guaranteeing the provisioning, in a secure way, of services allowing to improve the 
optimization of the energy consumption and production. 
2.2 Soft Digital Identity Challenges 
The concept of digital identity acted, as stated before, as enabler to get the access to a huge amount 
of different online services. However, a digital identity is also a possible key to get access to a huge 
amount of citizen’s personal information and might be subject to profiling analysis from which 
additional information on the e-ID owner can be derived. This is especially true for the so called soft-
identities, which are, by definition and nature, not standardized and to which, normally, the citizen 
pay poor attention in term of security despite the fact that they are commonly used indeed to access 
an incredible amount of personal information (think about the account of a social network).  
 From what briefly presented before, we can say that the infrastructures managing the digital 
identities will become more and more critical for the security and privacy of the citizen. 
Under this light, generally speaking, three are the real challenges and needs: 
1. Provide the citizen with means to control and regulate the use of the sensitive information 
made accessible through a certain soft-digital identity 
2. Identify the right trade-off between level of disclosure (i.e. the amount of information 
associated to a certain digital identity when used) and the citizen’s privacy level. This point 
assumes a high relevance especially in the context of digital identity inheritance, where 
smart-devices uses some piece of their owner’s identity to autonomously interact with the 
external digital world 
3. Educate the digital citizen to a better use of their digital identities 
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Only in this way it would be possible to establish a correct level of trust in the digital world.  
This report is organized as follows: in Section 3 is provided a first overview of digital identity related 
concepts, while in Section 4 are briefly described the standardization effors. Section 5 provides a 
description of the most used protocols and architectures dealing with identity management while 
Section 6 presents a classification of existing identity management research solutions. After 
analyzing in Section 7 the issues related to digital identity management, in Section 8 a framework 
allowing to enforce the control of the citizen on his soft-identities and personal related information 
is described. The prototype implementing the framework is showed in Section 9, while Section 10 
provide a brief overview of the test-be deployed to analyze the impact of the cloud on the security 
and privacy of the citizen. In Section 11 conclusions are presented.  
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3 Identity Models and Architectures 
As claimed in the introduction, the definition of the e-ID concept is not trivial, as, being linked to 
personal information, involve subjective elements.  
3.1 Electronic Identity (e-Id) Definition 
A real-world entity is represented in the digital world by an Electronic Identity (e-Id), which consists 
of a set of attributes associated to this entity. Identity attributes are a collection of name/value pairs 
as Figure 1 illustrates.  
 
Figure 1 – Digital Identity Model (source [15]) 
According to the standard ISO/IEC 24760 (part 1) [43] a digital identity is defined as “a set of 
attributes related to an entity”, where entity refers to an individual, an organization, or a device. 
Attributes are properties of the entity (e.g. address, phone number etc.), and they can be unique, i.e. 
able to identify completely their owner, or can be more generic, i.e. referred to the owner, but not 
able to provide a unique characterization of him/her. 
As in the case of physical identities (e.g. ID cards, passports, driving licenses etc.), also in the realm of 
digital identities an important role is occupied by the process of ID issuing.  
Under this light, digital identities can be categorized according to the security level adopted in the 
registration and authentication phases, i.e. when a digital identity is associated to a target entity. So 
we can have Hard and Soft electronic identities (e-ids). In the following Figure an example of identity 
classification is provided. 
Page 11 of 51 
 
Lo
w
H
ig
h
R
eg
is
tr
at
io
n
 s
ec
u
ri
ty
Medium Hard
Soft Medium
Detailed 
direct
Direct
Third 
party
Self 
assertion
No 1 2 3
Low High
Authentication level security
Assurance level
Verification
A
ut
he
nt
ic
at
io
n 
fa
ct
or
s
 
Figure 2 – Example Identity Classification 
In addition, not only the registration phase is relevant when evaluating the security, robustness and 
trust of a digital identity, but also the whole process of identity management. 
In this context, ISO/IEC 24760-2 clearly identifies a set of relevant roles:  
 Principal: Entity to which identity information pertains 
 Identity management authority: Entity associated with a domain with the capabilities to set 
and enforce operational policies  
 Relying party: Entity that relies on the verification of identity information for a particular 
entity  
 Identity Information Authority:  Entity related to a particular domain that can make 
provable statements on the validity and/or correctness of one or more attribute values in an 
identity  
 Identity Information Provider: Entity related to a particular domain that can make provable 
statements on the validity and/or correctness of one or more attribute values in an identity 
 Verifier: Entity that performs verification  
 Auditor: Entity with capabilities to inspect operations 
Despite the fact that ISO standards clearly define all the relevant elements of the digital identity 
realm, their presence into real frameworks is not always implemented, especially when considering 
soft identities. Unfortunately this fact constitutes, per se, a problem: since by definition in soft 
identities the registration phase is weaker, less regulated, the full implementation of all the 
elements defined by the ISO standard would greatly enhance the level of security of soft-IDs. 
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3.1.1 Areas of Application 
Digital identity solutions are currently applied in the following areas: 
 Government level: Passports, Identity cards, Driving Licenses, public health insurance cards. 
 Corporate level: customer access, bank accounts, credit cards. 
 Personal: personal/professional (Business services) sign-on, financial services, social 
networks (Facebook), business networks (LinkedIn), and many cloud services. 
3.1.2 Identity Management Architectures 
Identity management architectures can be classified considering the responsible entity for managing 
the users’ credentials and identifiers into: isolated, federated, centralized, and personal [15]. In the 
isolated architecture the user identities are managed independently by the service providers. In the 
federated architecture identifiers are shared between a set of service providers after an agreement 
is established between them, which is equivalent to a Single-Sign-On (SSO) approach. In a centralized 
approach, credentials and identifiers are managed by a third party (identity provider), and users may 
use the same identifier for all service providers (common identifier domain) or different identifiers 
(meta-identifier domain) to prevent tracking of their activities. Finally, users may decide to manage 
their identities for each service provider themselves, and this type of architecture is called a personal 
identity provider. 
Different identity providers may collaborate in an identity federation to enable identities provided 
by one identity provider to be automatically recognized and trusted by other identity providers.  
Figure 3 shows an example of an identity federation with users represented in blue, identity 
providers in green, and service providers (a.k.a. relying parties) in gray. The blue ellipse associates 
the users with an identity provider and the grey ellipse the identity providers with a set of service 
providers. The green ellipse represents a federation between identity providers. 
 
Figure 3 Example of Identity Federation and SSO 
End-users, identity providers, and 
relying parties domains
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4 Standardization Efforts 
The ISO/IEC 24760 suite of standards addresses the matter of identity principally from a 
management perspective. In particular ISO 24760-1 presents a reference for identity management, 
and specifies relevant concepts of identity and identity management and their relationships. ISO 
24760 part 2 and 3 are still in their drafting phase (final version expected by 2015), but they are 
expected to propose a reference architecture and a set of requirements related to the identity 
management (part 2), and a set of practices (part 3). 
ISO/IEC 29100:2011 “Information technology -- Security techniques -- Privacy framework” defines 
the actors and their roles in processing personally identifiable information (PII). Aspects specified in 
this standard, should be taken into consideration when defining the minimum privacy and security 
requirements of digital identity (both from a design and management point of view). 
Other standards-practices-recommendations of interest:  
- NIST SP 800-63: it defines (a) the guidelines for user’s remote authentication and (b) the 
technical requirements for the assurance levels of proofing, registration, tokens and 
authentication protocols. 
- ISO/IEC 29115: it defines the concept of entity authentication assurance framework 
- ISO/IEC 29146: it defines a framework for access management 
- ISO/IEC 27001: it provides the floor for the definition of an Information Security Management 
System (ISMS), which is relevant for the management of digital identity systems. 
- ISO/IEC 9798: it provides, among other things, an authentication model 
- ISO/IEC 29100: it defines a Privacy Framework and the key actors and principles for the 
management of personal data (included then the digital identities) 
- ISO/IEC 29100: it defines a Privacy Framework and the key actors and principles for the 
management of personal data (included then the digital identities) 
- ISO/IEC 29101: under development, it will provide a Privacy reference architecture framework  
- ITU-T X.1252: it defines a baseline for identity management terms and definitions 
- ITU-T Y.2720: NGN identity management framework 
- ITU-T X.1251: A framework for user control of digital identity 
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5 Protocols and Technical Approaches 
In the industry world a set of standards, protocols and technical approaches have been developed to 
support the different required functionalities in the identity management solutions. Though several 
approaches have been proposed in literature [37], we describe in the following only three of them, 
i.e. OpenID [30], OAuth [31], and Kerberos [32] since these solutions have been incorporated in 
products, such as Windows OS, Facebook, Google Wallet, etc., which are used by numerous users. 
Thanks to their large coverage, they can be intended as didactic means to understand the general 
security implications of every identity management solution. Furthermore, the understanding of 
those solutions should be considered of high importance as we are moving on cloud architectures 
that might introduce additional threats from the users’ perspective.  
5.1 OpenID 
OpenID [30] is an open standard to support authentication delegation to third party identity 
providers. Using OpenID users authenticate through a trusted third party identity service before 
accessing the wished service. OpenID supports the implementation of Single-Sign-On (SSO) and 
identity federations as well. In this way, users do not need to register for every service that they 
would like to use, but they can use the same account/credential to access different web services. In 
this architecture, the service provider is not needed to manage users’ identities and the 
corresponding credentials.  
When first interacting with an OpenID-enabled cloud service, an user needs to select an identity 
provider to use from a list of supported OpenID providers and to submit the claimed identity to the 
service. This obviously implies that previously the user managed to obtain an 
account/credential/identity from the identity provider. After providing this information, the user is 
redirected to the identity provider to perform the authentication process, using his service 
provider’s identity claim. The authentication process consists of two steps: identification and 
verification of the identity using the appropriate credentials (e.g. username/password). If the 
authentication is successful the identity provider redirects the user back to the service provider with 
an authentication token, which includes among others the user’s verified identity and the identity 
provider signature. The service provider extracts the authentication token to securely verify it and 
retrieve if required additional identity information from the identity provider. The verification 
procedure relies on a shared key, if established, otherwise the service provider forwards the 
authentication token to the OpenID provider for the appropriate validation. In the case of 
establishing a shared key between the OpenID and the Service provider there are two options:  
1. No encryption 
2. Diffie Hellman (DH) [33] 
If the “no encryption” mode is selected the shared key can be manipulated constituting the service 
vulnerable to impersonation attacks. In the case of DH the service chooses the DH parameters p, g. 
According to the OpenID specifications the default value for g is 2. The service provider chooses a 
random number Rs and sends the value of Ks =g^ Rs mod p to the OpenID provider. The OpenID 
provider chooses the shared key and computes the encryption key by choosing a random number Rp 
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by using the following formula Kenc = Ks ^ Rp  mod p. The OpenID provider returns to the service 
provider the encrypted shared key, which its value is computed by the following formula SHA(Kenc) 
XOR secret and the Kp =g^ Rp mod p, which is used by the latter to compute the encryption shared 
key by using the following formula Kenc = Kp ^ Rs  mod p for extracting the shared key. This shared key 
is used to validate the authentication token. It should be noted that in this setup users’ identities are 
exchanged in clear text.  
After the authentication token validation, the user can specify an authorization policy stating which 
identity profile information the service provider is allowed to access. This procedure is illustrated in 
the following Figure. 
OpenID 
Provider
Service
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OpenID-“Credentials” (4)
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Figure 4. OpenID User’s Identity Verification Procedure 
5.2 OAuth 
Authorization is the decision process after the authentication to allow or deny access to a resource. 
One prominent authorization standard currently supported by many service providers is OAuth [31]. 
Using OAuth users (resource holders) can temporarily allow access to their resources using an access 
token to a given third party service, without having to share their credentials with the latter. This is 
similar to the procedure followed in OpenID for validating users’ identities. An example application 
of OAuth is a user that would like to allow access to his calendar managed by a cloud service (e.g. 
Google Calendar) to a friend.  
In the OAuth framework, a user provides to a service an authorization grant in order to obtain access 
to the requested resources. To do this, the service requests to the end user to give an authorization 
access to the requested resources. The user is authenticated to the OAuth framework which issues 
the authorization token and sends it back to the service via the user. This procedure relies on HTTP 
Authentication [ref], while the authorization token is computed based on [HTTP Authentication: 
MAC Access Authentication]. The service in order to get access to the resource provides the 
authorization token and requests an access token from the resources server. The access token 
afterwards is used for accessing the requested resource. Note that in order to protect the exchanged 
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information it is suggested to employ the OAuth over Transport Layer Security (TLS). The whole 
procedure of OAuth is illustrated in the following Figure.  
OAuth 
Service
Resources
Use Resource A (1)
Give Authorization (2)
Request Authorization (3)
Authorization Token (4)
Authorization Token (5) Authorization Token (6)
User Resources
Resource (7)
 
Figure 5. OAuth Authorization Procedure  
5.3 Kerberos 
Kerberos is a network device mutual authentication protocol developed originally by the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) [1]. Kerberos requires a trusted third party to manage 
user passwords, public keys, and issue tickets. This trusted third party is called the Key Distribution 
Center (KDC), and consists of the Authentication Service (AS) and Ticket Generation Service (TGS).  
Using Kerberos, entities can authenticate securely on open unprotected network, assuming 
attackers have full control and can read, modify, and insert network packets. The client is 
authenticated with the KDC using a set of credentials, which might be a username/password 
combination. A result of the authentication process is also a session ticket that allows the 
verification of the client to other services that belong to the same domain. More specifically, 
whenever a client would like to establish trust with a specific service he generates an authentication 
request towards the KDC. The request contains the user’s identity, service name, expiration time for 
the authentication token and a random number. The KDC authenticates the client and generates a 
Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT), which is used by the client to retrieve tickets for accessing other 
services, and a session key. The TGT is encrypted with the KDC secret key, while the session key is 
encrypted with the users’ secret key. To access the service the client should first obtain a Ticket 
Grant Service from the KDC by sending a request that includes the TGT and an authenticator 
generated by the client and encrypted with the session key. The KDC responds to that request with a 
ticket, which is encrypted with the service secret key and a service session key generated by TGS and 
encrypted using the previous session key. As soon as the client receives the service ticket he can 
request to access the service. This is accomplished by generating another request towards the 
service in which is included the ticket and an authenticator again generated by the client, but this 
time it is encrypted using the service session key. The service checks the request and if required by 
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the client sends a response to accomplish mutual authentication. The high level procedure is 
illustrated in Figure 6, while the details of the protocol messages are presented in Table 1. 
KDC
Service
Authentication request (1)
Service request(5)
Authentication response (2)
Ticket request (3)
Service response(6)
Ticket response (4)
 
Figure 6. Kerberos authentication procedure. 
Message Descrition 
(1){UserId, ServiceId, Expr} The authentication request contains the user and the 
service id and a suggested lifetime for the ticket that will be 
generated.  
(2){UserId,Serviceid,TimeStamp,Expir,S
KKdc}Kuser,{TGT}Skdc 
TGT{ClientId, Timestamp, Expir, SKdc } 
The authentication response consists of two parts: (a) The 
user related information, which is encrypted with user’s 
secret key and (b) the TGT which is encrypted with the KDC 
secret key and thus the user is not able to decrypt it. The 
user exploits the TGT in order to get a service ticket for 
accessing the requested service.  
(3){ServiceId, TimeStamp, 
Authenticator) {TGT} SKdc} 
Authenticator = {ClientId, Timestamp } 
SKKdc 
The user generates a ticket request that contains the 
authenticator, which is encrypted by the session key 
received in message (2), and the TGT.  
(4) 
{ClienId,TimeStamp,Expir,SKser,}SKKdc, 
{TKser}Kser  
TKser 
{ClientId,ServiceId,Timestamp,Expir,SK
ser} 
The KDC validates the request received in message (3) and 
generates a service ticket (TKser) that is encrypted with the 
service secret key and is sent back to the user along with 
the other information encrypted with service session key 
(SKKdc).  
(5) {ClientId,TimeStamp} SKser, In order for the client to access a service, he generates a 
Page 18 of 51 
 
{TKser}Kser request that contains his identifier and the timestamp 
encrypted with the service session key received in message 
(4). Along with this information he also sends the service 
ticket received in the message (4).  
(6) {Service response}  This message is optional and is generated only if the client 
has requested to the service to prove its authenticity.  
Table 1. Kerberos messages 
Furthermore, Kerberos supports cross-realm operations between clients and service providers 
authenticated using ASs administered by different authorities. The administrators of the Kerberos 
realms must configure “inter-realm” keys to allow mutual authentication of entities from the 
different realms. Using cross-realm Kerberos supports the implementation of identity federations. 
Cloud solutions can rely on Kerberos for authentication of the cloud infrastructure nodes and clients. 
For example, the HBase cloud database relies on Kerberos to authenticate the computing nodes [34] 
and the OpenStack cloud solution also supports Kerberos as a plugin in the keystone authentication 
service [35]. 
5.4 Identity Management in the Cloud Infrastructure as a Service 
Though various open source platforms such as Nimbus, Eucalyptus, OpenStack, CloudStack and 
OpenNebula are available, OpenStack dominates the current market [36] for the deployment of 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). OpenStack is a multi-stakeholder effort with broad participation 
(150+ companies) from some of the biggest IT vendors in the world including IBM, Dell, HP, Intel, 
AMD, Cisco, VMware, Yahoo! and AT&T, as well as Linux vendors Red Hat, SUSE and Canonical. 
In the OpenStack platform the identity management, the authentication and the authorization 
services are provided by a specific service called Keystone. The identity service associates each user 
with a tenant and a role. In the context of OpenStack a tenant can be a project, a group or an 
organization that uses the cloud infrastructure. Under the “umbrella” of the tenants can be defined 
the users. The Keystone implements a role based access control system to control the access to the 
provided services. This approach is illustrated in Figure 7. Further, all the services employed in the 
cloud are configured with specific users assigning to them specific roles that are authenticated and 
authorized whenever it is required to provide a service as Figure 9 illustrates.  
Tenant 1 Tenant 2 Tenant 3
U1 U3U2 U1 U2 U1 U2
Role 1 Role 2
 
Figure 7. Keystone identity management architecture  
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Figure 8. High level architecture for cloud identity management 
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6 Research Solutions 
In this section we present a classification of existing identity management research solutions and a 
short description and reference to the main research papers of each class. Research solutions can be 
classified according to their focus considering the identity management architecture introduced in 
Section 5 in the following classes: 
1. Complete models and architecture solutions for user-centric, single sign on, or federated 
identity management 
2. Identity information model specifications using taxonomies and ontologies 
3. Authentication solutions including biometrics (e.g. face recognition and fingerprint), context-
based authentication, and combination of multiple authentication factors to increase trust 
4. Policy-based solutions for specification and  enforcement of authorizations and obligations 
to govern the access and usage of identity attributes (usage control) 
5. Trust management with support to Levels of Assurance (LoA) and certificate chains analysis; 
6. Approaches to mitigate privacy threats, privacy by design, attribute aggregation, and 
anonymization solutions 
7. Security risks and threat analysis studies with respect to security and user privacy 
8. Practical case studies 
6.1 Identity Management Models and Architectures 
Higgins [2] is an open source Personal Data Service (PDS) that allows user-centric management of 
identity attributes. The idea is similar to Windows Cardspace technology [3], where users have 
different identity cards with a pre-defined set of attributes that can be selected to be used with 
different service providers. The main component of the Higgins architecture is the Personal Data 
Service, which enables user-centric management of identity attributes and policies for each service 
provider. 
In the EU project Hydra [4] an identity manager solution called Hydra Identity Manager (HIM) is 
proposed to comply with the ten laws of identity identified by the project based on a detailed 
analysis of security, trust, and privacy requirements in ambient environments. Their ten laws of 
identity are: (1) user empowerment: awareness and control, (2) minimal Information disclosure for a 
constrained use, (3) non-repudiation, (4) support for directional identity topologies, (5) universal 
identity bus, (6) provision of defining strength of identity, (7) decoupling identity management layer 
from application layer, (8) usability issue concerning identity selection and disclosure, (9) consistent 
experience across contexts, and (10) scalability. The authors claim HIM is the only to comply with 
their ten laws and show a detailed analysis and comparison of HIM in contrast to SAML, OpenID, 
Higgins, CardSpace, and Liberty Alliance approaches. 
6.2 Identity Information Models 
Layouni and Pollet [5] propose an ontological layer using the Web Ontology Language (OWL) to 
describe semantic models of the user, user interface, work domain, and information content of an 
identity federation. Their approach aims to define a standard vocabulary that is understood by all 
stakeholders. They demonstrate their approach for one scenario of identity federation but it is not 
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clear how to apply their work for other scenarios. Their contribution is more on the use of ontologies 
for one identity management federation scenario and not on a general purpose ontology-based 
solution for any identity management scenario. A more general purpose ontology for identity 
credentials was also proposed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 
6.3 Authentication 
Agbinya et al. [11] proposes an authentication solution that combines face recognition and 
fingerprint authentication using an artificial neural network in order to increase the assurance level 
of the authentication process. The authors present the design and implementation of the solution, 
but no evaluation metrics with respect to performance and precision of the solution. A more 
comprehensive survey of this type of solutions has been conducted by the same authors [12] 
showing the strengths and weaknesses of different biometric authentication technologies and their 
fit for different application scenarios.    
6.4 Usage Control: Authorizations and Obligations 
With respect to usage control support, the PRIME project [7] proposes the only identity 
management solution that proposes to take into consideration the specification of obligations in 
addition to authorization policies with respect to the users’ identity attributes. However, their 
research results and proposed XML policy schema language do not include the support for duties 
with temporal constraints. Obligations in their policy language simply consist of strings or lists of 
rights with respect to access to the identity attributes after released to third parties specifying 
recipients allowed, purposes allowed, actions allowed, and time durations for storage. It is not 
possible to specify duties with time duration constrains related to the storage of a specific identity 
attribute after a transaction or activity is completed. It is not possible to express with their policy 
language complex conditions with respect to activities for example, stating that the “credit card” 
identity attribute should be deleted just after an online purchase is completed, or that the “civil 
address” of a customer should not be stored after an item purchased is physically delivered. 
The PrivilEge and Role Management Infrastructure Standards (PERMIS) [13] is a policy-based 
authorization solution that implements Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) using roles specified in 
X.509 certificates. PERMIS was originally developed to be used with the Shibboleth identity 
management system [14] but this is not mandatory, any other federated identity management 
solution could in theory adopt PERMIS. The main difference from standard RBAC is that PERMIS 
allows distributed assignment of roles since the X.509 certificates can be issued by multiple 
certificate authorities certified by an issuer up to a root self-signed certificate. PERMIS supports 
XACML for specification of authorization policies and SAML for exchange of attribute assertions. 
Since PERMIS relies in XACML, the support for specification of obligations is limited to strings usually 
without a precise meaning, or by means of standard propositional formulas [8].  
6.5 Trust Management and Certificate Chains 
Jøsang et al. [15] present a detailed analysis of the trust requirement in different identity 
management architectures. They analyzed the following architectures: isolated where each service 
provider manages the user identities independently, federated where credentials and identities are 
shared between providers, centralized where credentials only are shared between providers, and 
personal where the user manages the credentials and identities for each provider. The conclusion of 
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their study is that user-centric personal identity management provides great flexibility with not 
many additional trust requirements in comparison with the other architectures, and seems the most 
promising approach. 
Bhargav-Spantzel et al. [16] proposes to combine trust negotiation to better protect users’ 
information when using identity federations. Their main motivation is the amount of management 
necessary from the user side if multiple identities and policies need to be defined for the 
combination of identity and service provider. Ideally, users should not be required to define policies 
individually for each combination, and trust negotiation could help to reduce the amount of work 
required from users. With trust negotiation, policies can be defined to allow any member of the 
trusted federation access to the users’ identity attributes, without the need for individual policies. 
6.6 Privacy by Design and Anonymity 
One of the main anonymization solutions to support identity management systems is the Identity 
Mixer (Idemix) proposed by Camenisch et al. [17]. The idea behind Idemix is to use zero-knowledge 
proofs combined with encryption and signature schemes that allow users to reveal a selected part of 
their identity attributes. For example, a user may choose to assert the “city” attribute of their 
identity only without revealing their real name or detailed address information. 
6.7 Risk, Threat, and Impact Analysis 
Khattak et al. [19] and Gail-Joon & Sekar [20] propose approaches to perform risk and threat 
assessment of federated and user-centric identity management architectures. Lei and Takabi [21] 
show the security risks associated while using e-mail as online identity. In a nutshell, these 
approaches focus on risks for end users, relying parties, and service providers with respect to low 
levels of assurance of identities and privacy or identity theft risks for end users. 
Alkassar and Husseiki [22] present an impact analysis of adoption Trusted Computing (TC) 
technology to support identity management in the context of the Fidis (Future of Identity in the 
Information Society) consortium. The use of TC has many opportunities with respect to assurance 
levels since the root of the authentication is a hardware secure tamper proof module, however, it is 
unclear how the privacy aspects of this adoption would impact end-users’ privacy in real world 
deployments. 
6.8 Practical Case Studies 
White describes in [23] a case study of different identity management architectures in the Australian 
Public Sector. The author performed document analysis and interviews with designers of identity 
management architectures and identified the main patterns and differences in the designs to 
establish a common baseline. Common patterns are: information and data management, entity 
management, authentication, access control, provision management, credential management, 
directory services, meta-directories, governance, and privacy management. One interesting result of 
this study is the low concern of the interview participants with privacy in their architecture designs. 
In [24] Rieger presents an hybrid approach that combines both user-centric and federated identity 
management that was developed to support the Max Planck Society using the SAML-based 
Shibboleth. This approach was used by the 80 autonomous institutes and relies on an identity proxy 
to provide interoperability between the different identity management technologies adopted in 
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each institute. The selection of the respective home identity provider when a user tries to access a 
resource in a foreign institute is done based on the e-mail address of the user in a transparent way. 
The solution deployed in fact does not rely on user-centric identity management in the sense that 
the users are able to manage their own credentials. Details about the solution developed are also 
available in their website [25]. 
The STORK 2.0 project [26] proposes a set of pilot studies on the following application domains: 
banking, government, health, and learning. The studies are ongoing and there is no description of 
the results available yet. 
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7 Analysis of Stakeholders and Issues 
Scope of this section to classify and analyze the stakeholders involved in an identity management 
process, while magnifying the related issues an identity management system should solve. 
Figure 9 shows the main stakeholders in an identity provisioning scenario and the interactions 
between them. The Identity Owner authenticates with the Identity Provider and receives an 
authentication Token in case the authentication is successful. This Token is used by the Identity 
Owner to interact with a Relying Party, which verifies the Token with the Identity Provider and 
optionally retrieves identity attributes associated with this Token. The Identity Owner and the 
Relying Party are in many scenarios associated with a Service User and a Service Provider. This 
stakeholders and interactions may be to some extent different considering the technical solution 
adopted as described in Section 5.  
Relying Party
(Service Provider)
Identity Owner
(Service User)
Identity 
Provider
Authentication
request
Verify token, retrieve 
identity attributes
Interact using token
Token
 
Figure 9 – Identity management stakeholder 
Our objective in this section is to analyze the security requirements and issues for each stakeholder 
without considering the technical solution adopted. 
7.1 Identity Owner 
When authenticating with an identity provider, one important issue for the identity owner (a.k.a. 
service user) is the authentication method used to identify and verify the identity owner credentials. 
This authentication method may use one or many authentication factors including an 
username/password combination (mutually known secret), a PKI infrastructure with digital 
certificates, physical secure tokens (e.g. smart cards or hardware secure modules), biometric 
information, or context information that should not be easily tampered with (e.g. location assigned 
by a trustworthy sensor). 
Before being able to authenticate, the identity owner must enroll with an identity provider, and 
decide upon the authentication credentials and methods supported. When enrolling with an identity 
provider, the identity owner is assigned a digital identity with attributes that may be certified up to a 
certain level of assurance (LoA). It is task of the identity provider to ensure the LoA is enforced and 
to securely store the authentication credentials. The secure storage of the authentication credentials 
is also expected from the identity owner, to prevent identity theft and impersonation. An identity 
owner may enroll with many identity providers with different LoAs and authentication factors, and 
therefore may possess a set of credentials that must be secure for his home environment, banking, 
or work environment. 
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An identity owner may face a series of security threats and risks, such as: 
 Sharing of identity attributes between different identity providers allow re-identification and 
tracking of online activities. Shared identity attributes may imply that the user in fact is not as 
anonymous as expected; 
 Low-level information collected by identity providers may allow more fine-grain tracking of 
identity and online activity, for example using network address (IP), WiFi connections, browser 
configuration, and cookies; 
 Identity providers with low LoA and weak authentication process allows easy impersonation, 
for example, users can create as many digital identities with their own defined attributes 
without any verification during enrollment. This makes the digital identities less trusted; 
 Identity attributes and credentials should be stored securely by identity providers and users; 
 Identity owners should be able to specify access control policies to their identity attributes to 
be accessed by relying parties. Furthermore, policies should be defined to control rights and 
duties of relying parties after the identity attributes are accessed. Identity owners must be 
provided guarantees with respect to the enforcement of their policies; 
 The specification and enforcement of the security policies with respect to identity attributes is 
also sensitive and difficult task. Identity owners should be supported in the specification of 
these policies and must be ensured that their policies are not publicly available. 
 
A common practice is to provider software components to support end-users in the management of 
their online identities using desktop, mobile devices, or cloud services. Figure 10 shows an example 
of an End-user Identity Manager that manages the authentication tokens, credentials, and securely 
communicate this to the identity providers and relying parties.  
User
End-user Identity 
Manager
Credentials
Token
Token
(proof by possession)
Credentials
 
Figure 10 End-user identity manager 
7.2 Relying Party 
A relying party (a.k.a. service provider) is mostly concerned with the LoA of the identity attributes 
received and the trustworthiness of the digital identities. It is task of the relying party to securely 
store the identity attributes and session tokes received from the identity owners and to maintain 
and enforce a dataset of policies representing rights and duties with respect to the identity 
attributes. 
An important aspect for the relying parties is the management of the trust relationships with users 
and identity providers. A possible approach is to observe the behavior of users with less trusted 
identities to detect anomalies that may be a result of identity theft and impersonation, such as 
access from unusual locations and time. Trust management tools may also be used to assess the 
reputation of identity providers from incidents published in the media. 
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7.3 Identity Provider 
It is the identity provider duty to ensure secure authentication and session management between 
identity owners and relying parties. It is the identity provider task to select technical solutions that 
are proven secure and ensure the right implementation to prevent security incidents. 
Furthermore, it should also manage and enforce usage control policies that control access and 
future usage of identity attributes by relying parties. Identity providers also need to manage trust 
relationships with other identity providers in case identity federations are supported, for example, 
to enable Single-Sign-On (SSO) between administrative domains. 
The enforcement of rights and duties after relying parties retrieve identity attributes is a challenging 
task, and in case this cannot be achieved at least methods to ensure the detection of policy 
violations should be in place. One approach that could be used is the watermarking of identity 
attributes targeting particular relying parties, allowing future investigation in case leaks of identity 
attribute information is detected. 
Identity providers are responsible for securely managing databases of an identity profiles, usage 
control policies, authentication sessions, and trust relationships with relying parties and other 
identity providers.  
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8 Privacy-Aware Multi-Morphed Digital Identities 
As described in the previous sections, the electronic identity has a key role in enabling the citizen to 
access online services and digital information. On the other side it is potentially also a source of 
information leakage if not managed correctly.  The situation is even more critical if we consider that 
several of the e-id used by the citizen to get access to personal information (e.g. facebook accounts, 
email accounts, online data repositories etc.) can be generally considered “soft-identities”, i.e. digital 
identities for which the registration and authentication mechanisms are generally based on weak 
mechanisms (an e-mail address is sufficient to obtain these identities and the authentication 
enforcement is generally based on the usual login-password credential). 
The advent of smart-devices (e.g. smartphones) had the effect of exposing even more soft-identities 
to possible cyber-threats. To get integrated into the cloud and to provide the requested services, the 
smart-devices need to have access to the user’s e-IDs. In this case, it is not rare, for the end-user, to 
grant to the smart-devices a permanent access to his e-IDs (e.g. through the common function 
“remind the credentials on this device”). If on a side this allow to automatize several useful 
operations performed by the smart-device, on the other side, by delegating to it the authentication 
process, the end-user lose the full control on his own e-IDs and on the access to the services/data 
associated to it, dramatically jeopardizing their security. 
In this section we define the set of requirements needed to design a framework to enable end-users 
to have full control on the information in possession of their smart-devices and more generally, on 
the information associated to their e-ids.  The definition of a similar framework is on-going and what 
is described in this report is a first embryonic prototype aiming at studying new means to empower 
the control of the citizen on his personal data.  
A similar framework should take in consideration three main concepts:  
 Digital-Identity: i.e. a flexible mean to identify clearly actors interacting online and to define 
properties, features and rights of online services and information 
 Trust:  a sort of process allowing to automatically negotiate and establish the level of trust of 
a digital counterpart and associating consequently rights, permissions and obligations 
 Usage Control:  a mechanism to ensure that the data (or the right) obtained will be used 
only in the way defined by a certain policy. 
 
From a functional point of view, the privacy-aware-multi-morphed identity framework should: 
1. Enable the user to generate a set of customized digital identities, to be used in different 
context, and disclosing only the minimum portion of information required. It is important to 
remind here that with the term digital-identity we do not refer only to a digital certificate or 
to a set of credential, but to all the set of information (public or private) that, together 
concur at the characterization of the identity owner. 
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2. Allow, through  a trust negotiation scheme, to define the level of trust of the digital 
counterpart, to identify the maximum amount of rights to be granted to the counterpart, 
and to disclose the minimum required  amount of personal information to allow to the 
counterpart to establish, reversely, the level of trust required to access to a set of 
information/services 
3. Define and enforce obligations on the data/services accessed by third parties, accordingly 
with their level of trust. 
In the following of the chapter, the elements needed to implement this framework will be described. 
8.1 Identity Metamodel 
Figure 11 shows our identity metamodel. This metamodel is implemented in our prototype 
described in Section 9 and specifies the types of identity supported in an identity management 
system. Identity types can be physical or digital identities, and a special electronic document identity 
that is a physical type of one specific media (e.g. Smart Card) that contains a digital identity 
embedded on it. Digital identities are simply containers of named identity attributes verified using a 
verification method (e.g. face-to-face verification). 
 
Figure 11 – Identity Metamodel 
8.2 Multi-morphed identity, Inheritance and definition principles 
Key element of our approach is the following consideration: when verifying our email, when 
connecting to online sharing services, when performing activities in our name, smart devices need to 
authenticate themselves. To do that, they use the soft-identities of their owner. In other words, 
smart-devices inherit the identity of their owner, i.e. the smart-device will be able to “impersonate” 
its owner while performing some operations. If, in a safe environment, this aspect can be considered 
acceptable, in an open and potentially adverse environment as the Internet, it might expose the 
citizen to a new set of threats against his privacy. 
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An additional aspect to take into consideration is related to the registration process of a new soft-
identity. Let consider the following example: a user wants to get the access to an online forum. To 
do that, he need to pass through a registration phase, where he will need to provide a certain set of 
“sensitive” information, to get in change a couple id-password (his identity credential under a 
certain point of view), which will enable him to access to the forum. 
The amount of personal information to provide varies from service to service. However, in several 
cases, due to the fact that it is impossible to establish a true trust level between the requester and 
the registration entity, what is declared does not provide any guarantee of truth, leaving the service-
providers completely unprotected against malicious users willing to obtain false identities to be used 
for more complex illicit operations. 
To cope with the presented problems, digital citizens should be able to generate soft-identities 
guaranteeing, on a side, the minimum possible data-disclosure, and on the other, when required, 
providing means to the service-provider to get an acceptable level of assurance on the reliability of 
the information provided, without impacting on the right of privacy of the end-user. 
In our approach, a soft electronic identity (e-id) (intended not only as a credential, but also as all the 
set of information produced to build it) can contain: 
 Uncertified and anonymous information, i.e. information freely provided by the owner 
without any guarantee of truth 
 Signed un-certified information, i.e. information freely provided by the owner of the device 
and signed with his private key to guarantee that this information has been indeed provided 
by him, but without any guarantee on the truth of what claimed 
 Certified information, i.e. information directly coming from a portion of the owner's hard e-
id or certified by a trusted third party 
It is evident how, this information classification, directly implies different level of trust.  
It is not intention of this study to describe technically how a soft-id can be created on the basis of 
these information, as this will be explained in a further, specific report. 
However, we anticipate here in form of list, some of the techniques which will be explored to 
combine together these three classes of information to protect on a side the privacy of the citizen 
while guaranteeing at the same time an acceptable level of trust with respect to the criticality of the 
service needed: 
 Reputation mechanisms to verify the level of trust when using signed un-certified 
information 
 Evidence-graphs, to combine uncertified and anonymous information to verify their level of 
consistency 
 Blind signature schemes and zero-knowledge proofs with regard to “certified information”, 
to protect the privacy of the citizen and at the same time leverage on crypto mechanisms to 
obtain the higher level of trust 
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On the basis of the kind of information constituting a soft e-id (anonymous information, signed, 
certified) it would be possible to establish some trust rank. 
8.3 Trust Negotiation  
A Trust negotiation is an interactive process between two parties having the goal of establishing 
mutual trust to release a given resource or a part of it, considering the trust level achieved. In our 
case, a similar negotiation is needed to allow entities, such as smart-devices, rescue authorities, and 
end-users, to automatically identify the level of trust of the counterpart. After the level of trust is 
identified, they can decide if a certain request, either for information or action should be granted or 
partially allowed. 
There exist several trust negotiation schemes in literature [38][39][40], to our purposes we adopted 
the Trust-X[41] schema as it appears to be to our knowledge the most suitable for our needs: 
 It was designed on the principle that two parties can establish trust directly without 
involving trusted third parties, other than credential issuers 
 It was specifically designed for a P2P environment 
 Each party can alternatively act as requester or resource controller in different negotiations 
 It is supported by a XML-based Resource Negotiation Language, X-RNL allowing to specify 
negotiation policies over resources of any type 
 It allows to express group-based policies in which resources belong to more than one peer 
 It provides an interpretation of the language formulae in terms of states of peers 
For further details on an extension of Trust-X toward critical infrastructure protection please refer to 
[42]. 
8.4 Usage Control 
Usage control extends access control with the concept of obligations, which specifies constrains on 
the use of data after access is granted. In our solution we apply an usage control framework 
previously developed by us [27] that supports the specification of policies using mechanisms 
according to an Event-Condition-Action (ECA) rule structure. These mechanisms have their Action 
part executed when an Event pattern is observed and the Condition expression evaluates to true. 
In order to support both preventive and detective enforcement two types of events are specified: 
tentative and actual events. Tentative events indicate that an activity (action or interaction) is ready 
to be started in the monitored system but has not yet started, and actual events indicate that an 
activity has been completed. 
For tentative events the Action part of a mechanism specifies an authorization action that allows the 
activity to be executed, deny the execution of the activity, delay the execution, or modifies the 
execution. For actual events the Action part simply triggers the execution of additional actions. 
The Condition expression of a mechanism supports propositional, temporal, cardinality, and event 
operators. Our language for specification of conditions is based on Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) and 
evaluates event traces considering a discrete timestep with a predefined granularity. The condition 
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part of a mechanism can be parameterized with variables, which allows re-use and modularity in the 
specification of usage control policies. 
From a usage control perspective, our mechanisms can be used to specify authorization and 
obligations without any changes. Authorizations are essentially mechanisms specifies by domain 
administrators to be enforced on their own domains. Obligations are mechanisms specified by 
domain administrators that are delegated to other domains when interactions that exchange 
sensitive data take place. 
In contrast to existing frameworks for access and usage control our usage control framework is more 
expressive and can express complex authorizations and obligations. For example, using existing 
access control languages such as XACML [8] a policy stating that access should be denied to users 
after three unsuccessful logins cannot be expressed because XACML does not support cardinality 
operators. 
Section 9 presents our ongoing prototype implementation that supports the specification and 
enforcement of usage control policies. Our prototype only describes the specification support since 
the enforcement support is not yet integrated in our testbed described in Section 10. 
8.5 Architectural Design 
In this section we provide a functional view of our Trusted Usage Framework (TUF) using the building 
blocks described in the previous subsections. We identify two phases in the operation of the 
framework: a setup phase in which the owner of an hard e-id builds using a soft e-id generator a set 
of soft e-ids which will be left as inheritance to the smart-devices owned by the user, and an 
operational phase in which the smart-device is called to interact with the external world and 
provide information/services according to a set of policies. 
External 
World
Usage Control
Policy Enforcer
Hard Identity
Smart devices
1. Information/action request
2. Trust Negotiation
(exchange of certificates and Trust Level Computation)
3. Usage Control + Obligation policies request  
4. Usage Control +Obligation Policies 
5.  Data/service provided according to
the UC policies + obligations
Usage Control
Policy Enforcer
Soft-Identity 
Generator
Additional 
Information
6. Obligations  Installation
8. Usage Control 
Enforcement
7.  Data Storing
 
Figure 12 Framework Functional Overview 
More in details, this last phase is articulated as follows: 
 An external entity requests access to information or to execute an operation by the smart-
device 
 The smart device, prior to provide what requested, engages with the external entity a trust 
negotiation. The trust negotiation is bilateral, i.e. both the parties will be called to provide 
proof of their level of trust 
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 Once the trust negotiation is finalized, a level of trust associated to the external entity is 
established. The smart-device then interrogates the Usage Control Policy Enforcer (UCPE) 
asking for instructions on what to provide to the external party on the basis of the level of 
trust established 
 The UCPE provides the corresponding disclosure/execution policy and a set of obligations 
that must be fulfilled by the external party in order to obtain the data 
 The smart device sends the data allowed according to the policies, executes the allowed 
actions, and sends a set of obligations to the external party 
 The external party enforces the obligations 
 The received data is stored 
 The external-party's UCPE monitors the usage of the data obtained respecting the new 
obligation received 
It is important to notice that the information is provided to the requesting party only when the 
requester's UCPE would provide acknowledgment on the installation of the obligations. 
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9 Prototype Implementation 
In this section we present our prototype implementation that supports the specification of 
authorizations and obligations as Event-Condition-Action (ECA) enforcement rules. These rules use 
as a reference a set of inter-related design models representing different aspects of the identity 
management system, and are used as input for the runtime components in the framework. This 
solution to enable monitoring of ECA rules and execution of security enforcement behavior is named 
the Model-based Security Toolkit, or just SecKit [27],[28]. 
The SecKit consists of a collection of metamodels for specification of a computer system structure, 
information, behavior, context, identities, organizational roles, and security rules. These metamodels 
provide the foundation for security engineering tooling add-ons and metamodel extensions to 
address requirements of governance, security and privacy.  Figure 13 gives a high-level overview of 
the design models supported by the SecKit, which are: system (structure, information, behavior), 
context, identity, role, and security rules. These models provide the foundation for the design and 
runtime tooling, and extensions/add-ons focusing on specific security aspects of a computer system. 
Security Rules
Rule Template
System
Behavior
Structure
Information
Identity
Context
Event
Condition
Action
Variable 
Declarations
Rule Template 
Configuration
Variable 
Instantiations
Role
 
Figure 13 – Design models supported by the SecKit 
The first step using the SecKit is the specification of the System behavior, structure, and information 
model. The SecKit adopts a generic design language to represent the architecture of a distributed 
system across application domains and levels of abstraction including refinement relations support 
inspired in the Interaction System Design Language (ISDL) [29]. 
Figure 14 shows the behavior design model of the identity management scenario proposed in this 
report. The identity owner creates a hard identity and specifies policies governing the access to the 
hard identity attributes. The identity owner uses this hard identity to create a soft identity, and also 
specifies policies to govern the access to the soft identity attributes when accessing a service 
provided by a relying party the identity owner uses a set of trust negotiation rules to decide the 
policies for the soft identity being used in the access. The relying party is then able to retrieve the 
soft identity attributes and should enforce the policies provided by the identity owner. The details 
about this interaction and the information exchanged are depicted in the behavior model. 
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Figure 14 – Identity management behaviors 
In addition to the specification of the system models the SecKit also includes metamodels for 
specification of Context, Identity, and Role models. The identity model specifies the identity types 
and attributes that are allowed in this identity types. The role model specifies the organization role 
hierarchy, with the possible of inheritance of membership. For example, Doctor and Nurse could be 
specified as sub-roles of the Health Professional role. 
The context model specified types of Context Information and Context Situations. Context 
Information is a simple type of information about an entity that is acquired at a particular moment in 
time, and Context Situations are a complex type that models a specific condition that begins and 
finishes at specific moments in time. For example, the GPS location is an example of a context 
Information type, while Fever and In One Kilometer Range are examples of situations where a 
patient has a temperature above 37 degrees Celsius and a target entity has a set of nearby entities 
not further than one kilometer away. Patient and target are the roles of the different entities in that 
specific situation. 
The specification of authorization and obligation policies is done in the SecKit using an Enforcement 
Rule model containing Rule Templates that must be explicitly instantiated using Rule Template 
Configurations. A rule template follows an ECA semantics defined over discrete traces of sets of 
events, when the trigger event (E) is observed and the condition (C) evaluates to true the action (A) 
is executed. Templates are parameterized with variables that are instantiated by the template 
configuration. The Rules specified using the SecKit make reference to the design models of the 
system (structure, behaviour and information), roles, context, and identities. 
We model the start of an activity, ongoing activities, and the completion of an activity with the event 
modalities: start, ongoing, and completed. To support enforcement of usage control policies 
Page 35 of 51 
 
including authorization decisions we model tentative and actual events. A tentative event is 
generated when an activity is ready to be started but has not yet started, giving the opportunity for 
the execution of enforcement actions.  
A tentative event may trigger the execution of an enforcement behavior to allow or deny the 
execution of the activity. If the activity is allowed it is also possible to specify an optional 
modification or delay of the activity execution, for example, anonymizing activity data before the 
activity takes place. The execution part of an enforcement template may trigger the execution of 
additional activities, for example, notifications or logging of information.  
Figure 15 shows the same behavior model depicted in Figure 14 now specified using our prototype 
implementation. Our prototype offers support for specifying the different design models supported 
by the SecKit and also runtime enforcement models to support behavior execution monitoring and 
enforcement of the security rules. 
 
Figure 15 – Model of identity management system behaviour with interactions 
Each interaction depicted requires a level of trust that is negotiated during the initialization phase of 
the interaction. The established level of trust after the negotiation authorizes the successful 
completion of the interaction, which possibly implies the execution of an operation and/or exchange 
of sensitive data. In order to govern the authorization to execute the operation or access to the 
sensitive data we apply the runtime models and enforcement components provided by the SecKit. 
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Furthermore, we exchange with the interacting parties obligation policies that regulate how the data 
exchanged should be used. Trust levels, their corresponding authorization policies, and obligations 
must be specified for each interaction considering their impact and sensitivity. 
Figure 16 shows an identity model example specified using the SecKit prototype. In this figure we 
show two identity types representing the concept of hard and soft identities. 
 
Figure 16 – Model of soft and hard identity types with attributes 
Figure 17 shows one security rule template that anonymizes the Fullname when the “Verify Soft 
Identity” interaction is about to happen (try). The anonymization in this case is simply a replacement 
of the Fullname attribute value to the string “anonymized”. 
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Figure 17 – Policy to anonymized soft identity before the verification 
Figure 18 shows an addition more complex security rule template that is trigger 30 days after the 
“Verify Soft Identity” interaction is executed. This rule triggers the execution of the “Delete Data 
Behavior”, which deletes the E-mail identity attribute part of the verified identity. The specification 
of behavior triggered by the security rules is done using the standard support for behavior 
specification.  
 
 
Figure 18 – Policy template to delete e-mail identity attribute 30 days after soft identity is verified 
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Figure 19 shows the specification of the “Delete Data Behavior”, which is parameterized with one 
variable specifying the data to be deleted.  When this behaviour is instantiated in the security rules 
this variable must be also assigned a value.  
 
Figure 19 – Delete data behaviour type parameterized with variable 
Behavior instantiations executed by security rules can also be assigned a target entity, or in case this 
target entity is not specified the rule engine itself instantiates the respective behavior. The target 
entity must support runtime extension with security rule behaviors in order to allow the execution 
of the security rule behavior instantiation. 
Using the SecKit enforcement rules, policies can be specified for authorizations and obligations 
inside an outside of an administrative domain. For example, the identity owner can specify the 
instantiation of an enforcement rule that should be evaluated by a service provider. The delegation 
of policies and mutual establishment of domain identities is done using a trust negotiation approach. 
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10 Cloud Testing Facility 
To analyze the impact of soft-identities solutions on modern online services a testbed allowing to 
simulate real-online user experiences is needed. 
As the majority of modern online services is based on the raising cloud paradigm, we designed and 
deployed within the experimental open-space of the Digital Citizen Unit an infrastructure able to 
reproduce in a flexible way cloud and mobile-cloud use case scenarios. 
This section briefly provides technical details on such infrastructure.  
Though various open source platforms such as Nimbus, Eucalyptus, OpenStack, CloudStack and 
OpenNebula are available, OpenStack dominates the current market [36] for the deployment of 
Infrastructure as a Service (Iaas). OpenStack is a multi-stakeholder effort with broad participation 
(150+ companies) from some of the biggest IT vendors in the world including IBM, Dell, HP, Intel, 
AMD, Cisco, VMware, Yahoo! and AT&T, as well as Linux vendors Red Hat, SUSE and Canonical. 
Thus, we rely on OpenStack to deploy a cloud infrastructure as a service that will be used to 
understand the threats introduced by the cloud against digital identities schemes and research the 
possibilities of implement solutions for enhancing the digital citizens’ trust towards the provided 
services.  
10.1 OpenStack Services 
The OpenStack platform, as depicted in Figure 20, is composed of different services that might be 
hosted on the same or multiple nodes depending on the architecture.  
Dashboard
Identity 
Management
Image StorageNetworking Compute
 
Figure 20. OpenStack services communication interactions 
In the following subsections we briefly describe these services and the minimum hardware 
requirements for employing a private cloud infrastructure. 
10.1.1 Nova Compute Service 
The Nova Compute is the core service of the OpenStack framework providing the virtualization layer 
between the operating system and hardware, which enables the management of virtual machines.  
10.1.2 Image Service  
The image service manages the images stored in the cloud that users can instantiate latter. Image 
administration is usually restricted to specific users. This approach should be followed in order to 
eliminate the chances of uploading a malicious Image to the cloud infrastructure.  
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10.1.3 Storage Service 
OpenStack supports object and block storages through swift and cinder services correspondingly. 
The object storage (swift service) is suitable for providing storage on “static” data (e.g., images) 
through HTTP. The swift service is not relied on centralized controller providing this way object 
storage scalability.  
The block storage (cinder service) provides volumes of storages as individual hard drives – where 
each of these volumes is managed individually. The block storages is the basis of storage area 
network services in the cloud. It should be noted that since each volume is attached to an individual 
virtual server- as a result the block storage cannot be used for sharing data among different virtual 
machines.  
10.1.4 Virtual Networking (Quantum) 
The Quantum service provides the appropriate features for networking virtual machines both for 
internal and external communication. This is achieved by providing virtual networking components 
such as routers, networks, and other related services.  
10.1.5 Dashboard 
The Dashboard is the front-end service providing a user friendly interface (through web) to manage 
the cloud infrastructure. The Dashboard provides functionalities such as virtual machine creation 
and revocation, as well as virtual network management.  
10.1.6 Identity Management 
The OpenStak Identity service authenticates and authorizes access to the cloud resources for all 
possible entities that exist in the cloud infrastructure. This means that all the services running inside 
the cloud should be authenticated and authorized towards the identity management services. For 
more details please refer to Section 5.   
10.1.7 Hardware requirements  
The following table specifies the minimum hardware requirements as defined in [44].  
 Controller Network Compute 
Minimum num. of disks 2 1 1 
External + API network Yes Yes No 
Management network Yes Yes No 
VM Data network No Yes Yes 
Num. of networks 2 3 2 
Table 2. Architecture and node information 
 
 
Page 41 of 51 
 
10.2 G7 Cloud Infrastructure as a Service 
In this section we provide a brief description of the configuration of the cloud infrastructure 
implemented in the Digital Citizen Security laboratory. 
10.2.1 Configuration 
G7 cloud architecture relies on the OpenStack platform and consists of the following components:  
 Controller Node: Provides all the appropriate interfaces and services for managing the cloud 
infrastructure. For instance, hosts a web service allowing users to initiate their virtual 
machines and manages the lifecycle of virtual machines. 
 Network Node: Manages virtual networks and provides the necessary network services such 
as DHCP, Layer 3 Routing, Layer 2 switching and IP addressing. 
 Compute Node(s): Host the virtual machines. 
The high level architecture of G7 cloud infrastructure is illustrated in the Figure 21. We rely on this 
this setup because it can be extended easily for achieving high availability. It should be noted that 
the current deployment does not support high availability.  
G7 Cloud
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(dashboard, identity, horizon, images, object store)
Horizon: http://139.191.63.57/horizon 
Mobile 
Device
Network Node
(neutron)
Compute Node
(nova)
eth0 : 
139.161.63.57
Green network
eth1
10.10.10.0/24
(management network, ext-net)
Bridge 
interface
Bridge 
interface
Routing: 10.5.5.0/24 eth1 à Network Node
eth0
Virtual Machine
Virtual Router
10.5.5.0/24 demo-net eth0
eth0
 
Figure 21. G7 OpenStack Cloud Architecture 
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Quantum-Server 
Nova-API 
Nova-Scheduler 
Keystone 
RabittMQ 
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Network 
Open vSwitch 
Quantum-plugin-openvswitch-agent 
Quantum-metadata-agent 
Quantum-l3-agent 
Quantum-dhcp-agent 
2 4 GB 1 
Compute 
Nova-compute-kvm 
Open vSwitch 
Quantum-plugin-openvswitch-agent 
2 4 GB 1 
Table 3. Deployed services and hardware configuration for G7 cloud architecture  
10.2.2 Networking  
As illustrated in the Figure 21, the following three different networks have been deployed in order to 
support the G7 cloud infrastructure: 
 Management network: Used for management communication among the cloud nodes. 
 VM Network: Enables the communications for VM with the cloud (infrastructure) services 
whenever needed.  
 Public Network: Provides connectivity to VMs to other public networks such as Internet.  
10.2.3 Problems and Solutions  
During the deployment of G7 cloud infrastructure we face various issues, which are summarized in 
Table 3. 
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Service Affected Node(s) Problem Solution 
openvswtich-switch Compute/Network The service was not stated. 
“Error [quantum_aegent] Failed to create ovs patch 
port. Cannot have tunneling enabled for this agent”.  
This is because the installed package does not 
support tunnels. 
1. install –y openvswitch-datapath-sources  
2. install –y module-assistant 
3. module assistant prepare 
4. module-assistant auto-install openvswitch-datapath 
5. In case that module does not found your linux version 
do:  
a. uname –r (this gives linux version) 
b. cd /lib/modules/(linux –veresion)/build/include/linux 
c. ln –s –o /generated/uapi/linux/version.h 
6. re-run command four 
 Compute VM was not possible to start from CLI.  
Error: nova.compute.manager attribute error object 
has no attribute 
When you create a new virtual machine you have always 
to connect it to a network.  
Network Virtual Machines Udhcp started. Sending discover. In some cases the 
dnsmasq service does not return the IP address to 
the virtual machines.  
1. Delete the last record from the dns 
(var/lib/quantum/dhchp/some-number/host)  
2. kill –s HUP id of dnsmasq service 
Table 4. Problems and indicative solutions for cloud deployment 
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11 Conclusions 
The main contributions of this report are:  
- A preliminary analysis of the technical and scientific literature on digital identity management 
schemes 
- A model describing the interactions of the actors involved in the digital identity management 
process 
- The description of the main elements composing a framework to empower the control of the 
citizen on his own persona digital information 
- The deployment of a first working prototype applying the usage-control paradigm on the 
management of soft-digital identities 
- The deployment of an experimental platform for privacy and security test in the cloud. 
 
On the light of this initial study, it is evident how the pervasiveness of the digital world is quickly 
changing the life style of the citizen, which is relying more and more on digital-services to perform 
every-day operations. The phenomenon has recently received an additional burst thanks to the 
increasing diffusion of smart-devices and the consequent increasing inclusion of the citizen in the 
digital world. While on a side such a technological evolution makes finally possible the deployment 
of the so called Smart-Homes & Smart Cities in an Internet of Things fashion, on the other side, 
citizen privacy and security are becoming more and more exposed to cyber-threats. Smart-devices 
are becoming the repositories of a huge amount of information related to the personal life of the 
citizen and, in some cases they might have a critical role when called to perform actions impacting 
on the citizen's life. Key point of this digital revolution is the online-identity of the citizen, intended 
as the set of mechanisms allowing to the citizen and to digital services to recognize each-other and 
on the basis of that, to establish a chain of trust, rights and permissions.  
In this context, while a clear direction have been taken when considering the so called hard e-id (e.g. 
digital identities issued by governments under strict registration rules and management constraints), 
standardizations and regulations are still missing for what concern soft-id. The impact of this 
weakness cannot be considered negligible, as the majority of the daily online operations performed 
by the citizen rely on soft e-id and not on hard e-id.  
The protection of the citizen’s online privacy is a complex problem that needs to be tackled from 
multiple sides. Under this light, there is a strong need for mechanisms allowing to create a chain of 
trust between online actors, mechanisms to regulate the online information flow, to guarantee the 
citizen’s anonymity while at the same time providing assurance to the service provider on the trust 
level of the end-user. All these mechanisms will have to be coherently linked together under the 
umbrella of digital identity of citizens and smart-devices. 
As explained in the introduction this contribution constitutes only the first step of a more extensive 
research activity  which aim at exploring the aspects of digital privacy and anonymity of the online 
citizen. 
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